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Innovative nascent entrepreneurs face the problem of obtaining finance, mainly due to information 
problems. We use new data on capital seeking start-ups allowing distinction between planning stage 
and early stage. Being innovative does not affect the probability of having external finance in the 
planning stage but has a positive effect in the early stage. Early start-ups with patents have a 
significantly higher probability of having equity whereas debt is not affected. Patents, coupled with 
prototypes have a higher probability for external finance which may be due to reduced uncertainties 
and learning. The most important determinant of debt is house ownership. 
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The assumption of perfect capital markets implicitly assumed away any prob-
lems that might arise in obtaining ﬁnance for any ideas, innovative or otherwise.
As recently as 1988, Alan S. Blinder pointed out the prevalence of the assump-
tion that capital markets operate in a perfect manner,”A few years ago, in
revising my graduate course reading list, I looked for some modern literature
on liquidity constraints and investment. There was none” (Blinder, 1988, p.196).
Blinder might be right. Only a few papers for example, Stiglitz and Weiss
(1981) dealt with this issue. They showed ﬁnancing will not be made readily
available, even at the market interest rate, when Information is asymmetric and
uncertainty exists. Rather, according to the model posited by Stiglitz and Weiss
, the likelihood of credit rationing increases as uncertainty and asymmetries
regarding information increase. later, new literature emerged challenging the
assumption of perfect capital markets, and suggesting that, in fact, certain
types of economic activity might be subject to severe ﬁnancing or liquidity
constraints.
As scholars sought to empirically validate the theory of imperfect capital
markets leading to ﬁnancing constraints, they developed data bases at the ﬁrm
level linking the investment behavior of ﬁrms to ﬁrm-speciﬁc balance sheet
characteristics. For example, Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) found sys-
tematic evidence that liquidity constraints tend to be more binding for smaller
ﬁrms than for their larger counterparts. These ﬁndings have been replicated so
consistently that Petersen and Rajan (1992) conclude , ”Small and young ﬁrms
are most likely to face this kind of credit rationing. Most potential lenders have
little information on the managerial capabilities or investment opportunities of
such ﬁrms and are unlikely to be able to screen out poor credit risks or to have
control over a borrower’s investments”.
Still, after reviewing the empirical evidence concerning the impact and ex-
tent of ﬁnancing constraints, Chirinko (1993, p.1904) expressed doubts, ”While
the recently generated evidence points to the importance of ﬁnancial structure
and liquidity constraints, their sources and severity remain open questions.”
2One reason for the inability to identify the extent to which investments in new
ideas are constrained is that the samples estimating the extent of ﬁnancing
constraints are essentially truncated to include those ideas and projects which
have developed suﬃciently to have already generated existing or incumbent
ﬁrms. In fact, a more recent literature highlighting the role of incipient ﬁrms
not yet started by what has been termed as nascent entrepreneurs S. Parker
(2006), suggests that new ideas are not at all limited to existing, incumbent
enterprises. Rather, as Gompers and Lerner (2004) and Hsu (2004) show, the
innovative process leading to new products and growth can often start well
before a new ﬁrm is even started.
Just as entrepreneurs start new ﬁrms, nascent entrepreneurs consider start-
ing new ﬁrms. Thus, by the very nature of studies estimating the extent and
impact of ﬁnancing constraints being limited to existing, incumbent ﬁrms, a
potentially severe bias, or at least limitation is introduced. The existing studies
estimating the impact of ﬁnancing constraints have been limited to a truncated
distribution, where the left side of the smallest and earliest of ideas and projects
have been excluded. Such a bias is particularly alarming giving the well estab-
lished ﬁnding that the impact of ﬁnancing constraints is the most severe as
the ventures become newer and smaller. As Davidsson (2006, p.3) points out,
analyzing only existing incumbent ﬁrms will lead to a ”selection bias resulting
from including only start-up eﬀorts that actually resulted in up-and-running
businesses”.
Thus, while the existing literature has been able to shed considerable light
on the extent to which existing, incumbent ﬁrms have been subject to ﬁnancing
constraints, perhaps the even greater and more alarming impact of ﬁnancing
constraints which has deterred potential entrepreneurs from actually pursuing
their innovative ideas by starting a new ﬁrms has remained unexplored.
The purpose of this paper is to ﬁll this gap in the literature on new ventures
and liquidity constraints by shifting the lens away from existing, incumbent
ﬁrms to potential, or nascent, entrepreneurs. Thus, in the second section of
this paper, the theories of ﬁnancing constraints which have been developed to
3explain ﬁrm investment behavior are applied to explain the entrepreneurial be-
havior of potential entrepreneurs. The existing ﬁrm-based data sets are of little
use in trying to explain the behavior of nascent entrepreneurs rather than that
of ﬁrms, so in the third section a new large scale data base identifying nascent
entrepreneurs is introduced and explained. In the fourth section, the economet-
ric model to be estimated is speciﬁed. The empirical results are presented in
the ﬁfth section. Finally, in the last section a summary and conclusions are
presented. In particular, shifting the lens away from existing, incumbent ﬁrms
and to potential entrepreneurs reveals that just as ﬁrms are subject to ﬁnanc-
ing constraints, so too are nascent entrepreneurs. However, through procuring
protection of intellectual property, such nascent entrepreneurs can reduce the
extent to which they are subjected to ﬁnancing constraints.
2 Financing Innovation in Firms and Nascent En-
trepreneurs
Theories of ﬁnancing innovative activity have made considerable strides in re-
cent years. However, most of the theoretical models as well as their empirical
validation have been based on ﬁnancing innovative activity in existing, incum-
bent ﬁrms (Hall, 2002). These studies start with an exogenous ﬁrm and then
determine its ﬁnancial structure, in some cases analyzing how the extent of
innovative activity will inﬂuence that ﬁnancial structure. For example Aghion
et al. (2004) show that the ﬁnancial behavior of more innovative ﬁrms diﬀers
from that of their less innovative counterparts. In addition, they ﬁnd that the
use of debt decreases with R&D intensity because more innovative ﬁrms issue
equity in order to meet the investor’s participation constraint, even though it
would mean sharing ownership.
There are three main sources why innovative activity and new ideas tend
to be subjected to ﬁnancing constraints. The ﬁrst factor involves knowledge
asymmetries, which arise if the ﬁrm has better information about the returns
of their investment in intangible assets than do potential investors. Firstly,such
knowledge asymmetries will be exacerbated because intangible assets tend to
4have low collateral value. Hence, ”external ﬁnance may be expensive, if available
at all, because of adverse selection and moral hazard problems” (Carpenter &
Petersen, 2002).
The second factor involves the fundamental uncertainty in knowledge and
new ideas. As Arrow (1962) pointed out, this uncertainty characterizes the
relationship between innovative eﬀorts, or inputs into the innovation process,
and their resulting outcomes. New knowledge is intrinsically uncertain in its
potential economic value (Arrow, 1962). Thus, ”the challenge to decision making
is ignorance, the fact that nobody really knows anything” (O’Sullivan, 2006),
or at least, anything for sure. Thus, the degree of uncertainty inherent in the
innovative process, renders the decisions by potential investors to be based on
subjective judgements which may or may not coincide with the assessment by
the ﬁrm.. This implies that innovative activity may be burdened with diﬃculties
in obtaining ﬁnance, even at the prevailing market interest rates.
The third factor, also pointed out by Arrow (1962), involves the propensity
for knowledge to exhibit, at least partly, characteristics and properties of a
public good, i.e. it is non-excludable and non-rival in use. Thus, in order to
fully appropriate investments in innovative activity, the associated intellectual
property must be protected through some regime such as patents, copyrights
or secrecy. If knowledge spills over to other ﬁrms, the beneﬁts accruing from
innovation cannot be fully appropriated by the innovating ﬁrm.
Taken together, these three conditions involving uncertainty, knowledge
asymmetries, and the potential nonexclusive nature of investments in intan-
gible assets make it diﬃcult to evaluate the expected value of an innovative
ﬁrm as compared to non- or less innovative ﬁrm (Audretsch & Weigand, 2005).
The empirical evidence has generally found that the extent and impact
of liquidity constraints tend to increase as both ﬁrm size and age decrease,
that is for smaller and younger ﬁrms, and as the innovative activity of the
ﬁrm increases. Nascent entrepreneurs reﬂect potential ﬁrms that have not even
started, and in some sense are to the left of the distribution of a ﬁrm age of zero
and a ﬁrm size of zero. Thus, at least two of the conditions inherent in knowledge
5triggering ﬁnancing constraints are likely to be even more extreme for nascent
entrepreneurs than for existing, incumbent ﬁrms - knowledge asymmetries and
uncertainty.
In the Jovanovic (1982) model of noisy selection and learning, entrepreneurs,
and implicitly along with them their investors, learn about the market poten-
tial of entrepreneurs and their underlying ideas only through observing actual
market experience. If the entrepreneurial idea is viable and compatible with
the market, the ﬁrm will survive and grow. If not, it will stagnate and ul-
timately fail. Thus, as the actual pre-startup ideas become transformed into
post-entry performance, the actual amount of uncertainty associated with the
entrepreneurial start up decreases. The uncertainty and knowledge asymmetries
associated with nascent entrepreneurship should exceed that as the new venture
is actually launched and the startup subsequently matures over its life cycle.
Thus, nascent entrepreneurs would be expected to face ﬁnancing constraints at
least as great, but presumably even greater, than do new ventures subsequent
to the startup.
As a result of the reduction in the uncertainty inherent in the new venture
resulting from learning about market compatibility as the ﬁrm evolves over time,
the capital structure would also be expected to evolve over the ﬁrm life cycle.
In particular, equity capital will tend to play a more important role in the early
stages of the life cycle. To the degree that there are observable characteristics
predicting subsequent performance of the new venture, obtaining such equity
capital, including venture capital, will be easier. One important signal reducing
the extent of uncertainty is intellectual property, particularly if it is legally pro-
tected in the form of patented inventions. As Audretsch and Lehmann (2004),
Scellato (2007) and Rossi (2005) show, high technology ﬁrms with patented in-
ventions have a capital structure with a greater reliance on equity as the source
of ﬁnance. In particular, high technology ﬁrms with patented intellectual prop-
erty exhibit both a higher propensity for the capital structure to rely more on
venture capital ﬁnance, while at the same time a lower propensity to be subject
to ﬁnancing constraints.
62.1 Appropriability and Financial Constraints
As is well known, the markets for knowledge create opportunities for increas-
ing investment in innovation. From the policy perspective too the intellectual
property system is being pushed mainly to ensure the appropriability of inno-
vation and increase investment further. As the European Commission1 opines,
”One direct means(to stop leakage of knowledge) is the strengthening of the
appropriability conditions through an eﬀective system of intellectual property
rights. Even though the commission feels that public ﬁnancial support would
also be a solution, not all the necessary investment comes from public support.
Entrepreneurs have to resort to private ﬁnancing too. Most of the nascent en-
trepreneurs invest in innovation with their own money (self-ﬁnancing) and try
to gain protection mechanisms which per se ensure appropriability. In this case,
the questions remain as to the length of time until which the self-ﬁnancing
has to be done and whether appropriability can serve as an eﬃcient signal to
external investors.
Due to the emergence of various equity stakeholders (VCs, Business Angels
etc) it has become important for them to ensure that the entrepreneur signals
proﬁtability and survival prospects. Ideally, ﬁnancial constraints should not
be a problem once appropriability conditions are eﬃcient. Remaining useful
life(RUL), expected income generation (through IP valuation) are some of the
measures through which private equity suppliers verify the proﬁtability and
survival prospects of the clients. A nascent entrepreneur therefore would either
be able to win the investment or lose it. Loosing the investment comes when IP
is available but either the value is too low and RUL is very less. This manner
of assessment depends on whether the VC for example, is willing to take up
the cost of valuation and scrutiny. If the responsibility lies on the client, then
it depends on whether the client resorts to valuation and bears the cost. Given
that the nascent entrepreneurs mostly run on own money any additional cost
(which of course does not reduce all the uncertainty), will be compromised upon
and eventually investment may be very less or nil.
1 (European Competitiveness Report 2006, 2006)
7The easiest way therefore to ensure appropriability (at least for signaling
to the investor, in the short run) perhaps is to build a prototype. This would
make sure the entrepreneur does not have to resort to high valuation costs (if the
purpose is only to get investment) and will also make sure the production pos-
sibilities and whether actually someone can imitate the idea and subsequently
the product. If in this case the appropriability conditions are signaled to be
high, through a prototype, the chances of obtaining external ﬁnance may ease
for the nascent entrepreneur.
2.2 Patents and Prototypes as Signals to Investors
It has been long established in the literature that agents take advantage in
situations of adverse selection faced by the principal, when information is pri-
vate and hence distorts contracts. A patent or a prototype renders information
public (not necessarily complete), and in the case that information is public,
the contracts cannot be distorted and the agent cannot act in a selﬁsh manner.
If the patents and prototypes are not shown, the principal will be unable to
design contracts that take into account the possible information asymmetry en-
tirely. To decrease moral hazard by the agent the principal will therefore oﬀer
contracts which are contingent upon the results.
Such contingent contracts inﬂuence the information which the agent will
choose to disclose, along with investment decisions. In particular, the agent
will choose to disclose her intellectual property and capabilities in the form of
a patent and prototype to signal her underlying capabilities and know how,
provided the public information makes her better oﬀ 2(Macho-Stadler & Perez-
Castrillo, 1997)
How do these signals matter when an entrepreneur has to choose or is con-
fronted with a choice of ﬁnancing sources? Certainly each of the principals has
a diﬀerent yardstick on perceiving the signal received and processing it. In this
paper we consider mainly the role of a signal in inﬂuencing any external source
of ﬁnance.
2A ’signal’ is deﬁned as “some activity, or some decision, that proves that the agent con-
cerned has a certain ability or characteristic, or possesses certain information
8For further development some notation is required. Let us denote the eﬀort
involved in terms of time required to come up with signals as Tpand Tpr . There
are two types of entrepreneurs, Good and Bad. The probability of success of
the two agents is Pg&Pb such that Pb < Pg . Let us assume that the principal is
informed about the quality of signals and the expected beneﬁts from successful
and failed ventures are πs&πf .
2.2.1 Patents, Prototypes and Financial Constraints
Patents are the result of government intervention through which appropriability
can be ensured from research and development and further investments can be
encouraged (in the line of thought followed by Arrow (1962),Nelson (1959), and
Levin et al. (1987)). Anton and Yao (2004) suggests that whether intellectual
property becomes patented depends on the amount of the information to be
disclosed to the intellectual property markets leading to ”little patents and big
secrets”. In this manner patents signal other market participants to anticipate
the true value of an innovation, which also incurs the cost of imitation. If the
signaling beneﬁts are greater than imitation costs, entrepreneurs would have an
incentive to disclose the patents to market participants (customers etc).
Patents may act as a signal not just to market participants, but also to
potential investors. As indicated above the signal through patents acts in the
mode of information and characteristic . Development of an invention from an
idea and a concept to a patent indicates that the ﬁrm has prospective compe-
tent characteristics required in the market. The beneﬁt to the investor πf when
the ﬁrm fails to commercialize successfully generally includes rights and condi-
tions which may frequently also share royalties accruing from the patent along
with other intellectual property monetary beneﬁts. In this way investments in
start-ups by entrepreneurs holding patents may be considered partly secured,
provided contracts are properly drawn.
Another dimension of patenting behavior stems from the fact that the
propensity to patent intellectual property tends to follow a trend of the patent-
ing activities of other market participants. In this case if every agent patents and
9there is no other signal that could decrease the adverse selection problem, then
the signal would become non-informative. The principal is considered to evalu-
ate the signals using Baye’s rule, with prior probabilities pgandpb. If the proba-
bilities with respect to the success/failure, given the signal, are pg(TP,Tpr)and
pb(0,0), then in the pooling equilibrium case both are treated equally (Macho-
Stadler & Perez-Castrillo, 1997) i.e. p(TP,Tpr) = P. Pooling equilibrium creates
a similar situation to the principal as with the adverse selection problem. Hence
the principal oﬀers contracts that give her prior established expected utilities
E(Ug)&E(Ub)dependent upon πs&πf , independent of the signals provided.
The second case is where all the agents do not use the same signal, Good
agents signal Tp&Tprand and bad agents choose T = 0. This leads to the
separating equilibria case where the principal would set pg(TP,Tpr) = 1 and
pb(0,0) = 0. As a result, the principal assesses the signal type and this would
decrease the adverse selection problem .It can be therefore understood that
patenting behavior by every agent leads to greater ﬁnancial constraints. Our
point however, is that since all agents , in reality cannot resort to the same sig-
nal, attracting investment will be easier and the probability of obtaining ﬁnance
external to the ﬁrm becomes easier as long as the patent is ’strong’ in terms of
remaining useful life, novelty, and commercialisability. In terms of the ﬁnancing
contracts, we expect the above signals to work well with equity suppliers rather
than banks since banks cannot aﬀord costly veriﬁcation and process the signals
for each contract, while benchmarks like collateralization and credit ratings are
easier ﬁlters (in terms of credit rationing). In order to overcome the information
ineﬃciencies with respect to debt, equity therefore serves as an option (Hillier,
1997). Innovating nascent entrepreneurs therefore would ﬁnd it diﬃcult to sig-
nal to the banks as well as equity suppliers, since the type of signals needed are
diﬀerent.
While patenting indicates the characteristics and information the agent is
endowed with, a prototype particularly acts as a signal for the ability of the
agent. What is ability in the eyes of an investor? Broadly we can think of
manufacturing ability, ability to ensure a sound pricing and costing strategy.
10This would mean a big step ahead of the business plan. Every principal seeks to
ﬁnd such agents that would signal future plans and proﬁtability as accurately as
possible. Even though planning techniques exist as well as advanced to provide
accurate numeric forecasts, the ability of a prototype to signal success/failure
of the start-up is higher.
As observed earlier, a reduction of information asymmetries and the quality
of a signal remains a crucial step in reducing ﬁnancing constraints. A stronger
signal that can substantially reduce information asymmetry is the development
of a prototype.
Prototyping is a crucial step in the commercialization process. In some cases
prototyping makes patenting easier, and in some cases it serves as a crucial
link to the patent and ﬁnal realization of the ﬁnished marketable product.
When an agent possesses a prototype, she can clearly determine the processes
required for large-scale production, the resources needed and the best suppliers
can be charted out. Hence production plans can be strengthened. Once the
production plans are clearly deﬁned the costs and hence the pricing strategy
can be accurately approximated by the agent. Business plan projections become
much accurate and hence having a prototype serves as a signal to decrease
information asymmetry. It also increases the scope and scale of appropriability
by enabling the agent to beneﬁt from subsequent intellectual property rights,
such as design rights (on the prototype and production designs), copyrights
and trademarks etc. Therefore, the expected beneﬁt from investing in a start-up
having prototypes tends to be high for investors, thus increasing the probability
of the agent to obtain external ﬁnance. As is well known therefore, the higher
the ability, the higher will be the likelihood of obtaining external funding. This
tends to be most relevant in the case of nascent entrepreneurs confronting the
most severe credit rationing, as well as information asymmetry problems. A
nascent entrepreneur who possesses both a patent and prototype therefore has
an advantage in terms of obtaining external ﬁnance. This tendency may not be
straightforward and may be aﬀected by the sector (in some sectors patenting
is not the ﬁrst priority) and risk taking attitude of the investor, even though
11the signals are strong and reduce extent of information asymmetry. Such a case
would happen mainly when the entrepreneur is in the juncture between the idea
and an actual start-up.
The above analysis leads us to formulate two hypotheses, mainly,
• Hypothesis 1: The probability of obtaining external ﬁnance (hence de-
crease in ﬁnancial constraints) is greater if the nascent entrepreneur sig-
nals underlying knowledge by holding a patent.
• Hypothesis 2: The probability of obtaining external ﬁnance is greater for
the nascent entrepreneur when she holds both a patent and a prototype.
3 Data
To test the two main hypotheses linking the capital structure of nascent en-
trepreneurs to their ability to undertake and signal innovative activity, the
types of data sets providing information about the ﬁnancial structure of (new)
ﬁrms that have been used in previous studies are of little use. This is because of
the focus in this paper on nascent entrepreneurs rather than established ﬁrms,
however young they may be. Thus, a very diﬀerent type of data set providing
information on both individuals who are considering launching a new venture,
that is nascent entrepreneurs, as well as their innovative activity and ﬁnancial
prospects is required to test the hypotheses posited in the previous section.
3.1 The Innovative Nascent Entrepreneurs Database (INED)
Thus, in this paper a new data set is developed and applied, which consists
of 4,122 entrepreneurs (including individuals who are considering launching a
new business), investors and others. The data set was created for the Ewing
Marion Kauﬀman Foundation by the Center for Innovative Entrepreneurship
(CIE) in May-June, 2005 and consists of a web-based survey of potential en-
trepreneurs. The aim of that project was to investigate whether the web site of
a venture capital directory can be used as a research tool. For this purpose ,CIE
surveyed visitors of the web site http://www.vﬁnance.com, which is a location
12for entrepreneurs seeking ﬁnance and interested in ﬁnding the names of poten-
tial angel investors or venture capital ﬁrms. CIE implemented the survey using
two methods. This ﬁrst was to send each web site visitor an email inviting her
to participate in the survey. The second method involved soliciting a random
sample of web site visitors to participate in the survey. An important qualiﬁ-
cation of this data base involves selection bias. The data base consists solely of
individuals suﬃciently interested in obtaining ﬁnance that they visited the web
site. Thus, individuals not interested in obtaining ﬁnance for a new venture are
not included in the data base. However, it is important to emphasize that the
two major hypotheses do not imply starting with a sample of individuals rep-
resentative of the overall working population and then identifying which ones
constitute nascent entrepreneurs. Rather, in this study the starting point should
consist of individuals who are already nascent entrepreneurs. Thus, the appro-
priate data base should exclude those not considering launching a new venture
and include only those individuals who can be reasonably classiﬁed as being a
nascent entrepreneur. Thus, while the well-known PSED (Panel Study of En-
trepreneurial Dynamics), for instance, is a representative sample of American
adults and was initiated to ”provide systematic, reliable and generalizable data
on important features of the entrepreneurial or start-up process” (Reynolds,
Carter, Gartner, & Greene, 2004), it is more appropriate for testing hypothe-
ses distinguishing between nascent and non-nascent entrepreneurs. While the
sampling mechanism used in PSED is appropriate to generate a sample that is
nationally representative with respect to population characteristics, like age or
education, it might not be ideal to analyze innovative nascent entrepreneurs’
sources of external ﬁnance, where a data base consisting solely of innovative
nascent entrepreneurs is more appropriate.
As pointed out by Davidsson Davidsson (2006, p. 55) the downside of the
’representative’ sample provided by the PSED ”is that the sample will be very
heterogenous and dominated by imitative, low-potential ventures.” He therefore
suggests to ”use other sampling mechanisms than probability sampling in or-
der to get suﬃcient numbers of high-tech ﬁrms, for instance” (Davidsson, 2006,
13p.56). In this respect, the data base used in this paper based on the CIE sur-
vey is a valuable source of information about innovative nascent entrepreneurs,
who are, by deﬁnition, seeking capital. Moreover, As the descriptive statistics
presented in Section 4 show, the fraction of innovative entrepreneurs included
in this data base is strikingly high.
3.2 Deﬁning and Measuring nascent entrepreneurs
While the PSED data base consists of a sample presumably reﬂecting char-
acteristics of the overall population,We created the Innovative Nascent En-
trepreneurs Database (INED) from the CIE survey to consist solely of nascent
entrepreneurs. However, in creating the INED, the similar criteria were used
that a respondent had to meet in order to be considered as a nascent en-
trepreneus. In particular, for an individual to be classiﬁed as a nascent en-
trepreneur in the PSED, this involved each record meeting three criteria: (1)“now
trying to start a new business, (2)“currently active in a startup eﬀort and ”an-
ticipates part or full ownership of the new business”, and (3)“has NOT yet at-
tained positive monthly cash ﬂow that covered expenses and the owner-manager
salaries for more than three months (Reynolds et al., 2004, p. 268).
For the Innovative Nascent Entrepreneurs Database (INED), an individual
was similarly classiﬁed as being a nascent entrepreneur if the three following
analogous conditions were met:
• the individual is seeking capital to start a new business,
• the individual intends to be owner or part owner of the business, and
• business has not generated revenues in 2004 and 2005,
Respondents claiming zero percent ownership or that positive revenues were
generated in 2004-2005 were not classiﬁed as being nascent entrepreneurs. The
questions included in the survey are included in the appendix. The sample can
be distinguished as consisting of two major groups, or sub-samples - a group of
individuals engaged in the planning stage for starting a new ﬁrm and the group
of individuals actually engaged in the launch of a new venture. An individual
14was classiﬁed as a planning stage nascent entrepreneur, or belonging to the
former group, if she was (1) planning to start a new business, and (2) the start-
up is not a business, in that it is not in operation and no products or services
have been launched or oﬀered for sale. By contrast, a respondent was classiﬁed
as being in the latter group if a venture has been launched but is not generating
revenue, and if at least a concept has been developed.
Those who reported that they started their business before 2005 and/or that
the number of employees, not counting the owners, exceeds one were excluded
from the ﬁrst group (planning stage nascent entrepreneurs). Similarly, those re-
spondents reporting that they started their business before 2003 and/or that the
number of employees exceeds ten were excluded from the second group (incipi-
ent start-ups). These stringent criteria were for classifying nascent entrepreneurs
as either planning stage or incipient start-ups were applied to maintain the in-
tegrity and consistency of the data.
External source of ﬁnance: The data set contains information about the
sources of business ﬁnancing. Entrepreneurs reported whether they used the
following external ﬁnancing sources to establish their business: 1) bank loans to
the business, 2) home equity loan in an owner’s name, 3) other bank loans in
an owner’s name, 4) venture funds in exchange for stock/ownership in company
and 5) individual investors or companies in exchange for stock/ownership in
company. While the ﬁrst three sources are indicators for debt, the last two
sources represent indicators for equity.The consistency of the responses were
checked and veriﬁed. First, those records where respondents reported equity
ﬁnance and 100 percent ownership were excluded from the sample. Second,
those records where a respondent reported owning zero percent of the business
and at the same time reported having equity as a source of business ﬁnancing
were also excluded from the sample.
Innovation: In the survey entrepreneurs were asked the following question,
”Does your business own or have you applied for a patent that is essential to the
business?” A nascent entrepreneur is classiﬁed as being innovative or at least
15engaged in a knowledge-based start-ip if the answer is YES. Alternatively, the
development of a prototype can be viewed as an indicator of innovation. The
dataset provides information about this and it will be discussed in Section6.
Business relevant information: The data set contains additional informa-
tion about the entrepreneur and the proposed startup. In particular, records
indicate whether a business plan was written, whether the business has inter-
national links, whether the respondent is a serial entrepreneur, whether the
business was started by a single person or a team of people and whether the
respondents owns a house that can be used as collateral (see Appendix for the
questions asked).
4 External source of ﬁnance and start-up character-
istics
The means and standard deviations of all variables are reported in 1. As can
be seen from the table, 12 percent of the nascent entrepreneurs in the planning
stage use debt as an external source of ﬁnance. By contrast, 19 nascent incip-
ient entrepreneurs in the very early stage of the venture rely on debt. With
respect to equity ﬁnance, the diﬀerence between both the planning and incipi-
ent entrepreneurs is even larger. While only 6 percent of nascent entrepreneurs
in the planning stage have equity ﬁnance, more than 20 percent of the nascent
entrepreneurs in the early start-stage have equity ﬁnance. These diﬀerences are
statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. Nascent entrepreneurs in the plan-
ning stage choose either debt (25) or equity (50), whereas only one entrepreneur
of this group relies on both, debt and equity. In the early start-up stage 19 en-
trepreneurs rely on both sources of external ﬁnance while 73 choose only equity
and 79 choose only debt.
The fraction of innovative nascent entrepreneurs, which includes those with
a patent application or ownership of a business related patent, increases from
15.5 percent in the planning stage to more than 20 percent in the early start-
up stage. An even stronger increase can be observed for the fraction of en-
16trepreneurs who report to have developed prototypes. It is 6.1 percent in the
planning stage and 25.2 percent in the early start-up stage. In the group of
entrepreneurs in the planning stage, 66 applied for a patent or own one and 32
percent of these have also developed a prototype. In the early start-up stage,
155 new ventures have patents or have applied for patents, and 47 percent of
these innovative start-ups have also developed a prototype. Although we do
not know whether the patents are related to the prototype, it is likely that at
least some of the nascent entrepreneurs try to protect their business relevant
innovation (prototype) through patents.
[insert table 1 about here]
As can be seen from the table, 63 percent of the nascent entrepreneurs in the
planning stage have developed a concept while 30 percent of them are still in
the process of developing a concept. As can be expected, the fraction of nascent
entrepreneurs that have developed only a concept is signiﬁcantly smaller for the
group of nascent entrepreneurs in an early start-up stage. Most of them report
’start-up operation’ but only 4.6 percent have already launched a product or
services. However, this is not surprising since these are start-ups that have not
yet generated revenue.
There are also signiﬁcant diﬀerences between both groups with respect to
the fraction of those entrepreneurs who have written a business plan, who have
established links with international partners and who have previously started
a business.. In the group of incipient nascent entrepreneurs, these fractions are
larger. Moreover, there are more serial entrepreneurs in this group and more
team start-ups. The large fraction of teams (50 percent) is consistent with the
prevalence of teams reported by the PSED.
[insert table 2 about here]
Table 2 reports the number and share of nascent entrepreneurs who have
chosen debt and/or equity ﬁnance for sub-samples of innovative (with a patent)
and non-innovative (without a patent) nascent entrepreneurs. In the planning
stage the fraction of innovative nascent entrepreneurs without external ﬁnance
(14.6 percent) corresponds with their fraction in the total sample (15.5). With
17respect to debt and equity they are slightly over-represented in this stage. In
the incipient stage, however, they are under-represented in the category ’no
external ﬁnance’ and they are over-represented with respect to equity ﬁnance.
This points to a remarkable change in the capital structure between these early
stages of the new venture.
One obvious explanation for the signiﬁcant diﬀerences between nascent en-
trepreneurs in the planning stage and their counterparts in the incipient stage of
launching a new venture is that at least some of the start-up characteristics may
reﬂect the probability of making a transition from the a nascent entrepreneur in
the planning stage to a nascent entrepreneur in the early start-up stage. Con-
sequently, the fraction of start-ups with these characteristics would be higher
in later stages of the start-up.(S. C. Parker & Belghitar, 2006) investigated the
decision of nascent entrepreneurs to quit, to remain a nascent entrepreneur or
to start a new ﬁrm. They found, for instance, that preparing business plans
and having experience in business ownership do not inﬂuence the decision by
nascent entrepreneurs, whereas team ventures are less likely to make the transi-
tion form planning stage to launching the new venture. Another interpretation
is that many nascent entrepreneurs may begin to write business plans, intensify
their innovation eﬀorts or try to establish links to international partners once
they have taken the decision to launch a new venture.
In summary, the descriptive statistics suggest that the decomposition of the
sample into two groups is reasonable since both groups diﬀer with respect to
relevant business characteristics. In the econometric analysis we will therefore
investigate each group separately to test how innovative activity inﬂuences the
capital structure of nascent entrepreneurs.
5 Econometric Model
Suppose that a nascent entrepreneur i can choose between sources of ﬁnance j
which diﬀer with respect to the expected proﬁt, i.e. each of them is associated
with certain costs. A proﬁt-maximizing entrepreneur will opt for the alterna-
tive (denoted πij) which yields the maximum proﬁt among the four ﬁnancing
18alternatives (no external ﬁnance, debt, equity and debt & equity).
πij = Max(πi0,πi1,πi2,πi3) (1)
The proﬁt associated with each of these sources of ﬁnance is assumed to be
determined by business-speciﬁc factors x,
πij = xijβ + uij, i = 1,...,N j = 0,...,3. (2)
where β is a parameter vector, uij is an error term and i denotes the nascent
entrepreneur. The proﬁt associated with each ﬁnancial decision is an unobserv-
able latent variable. What can be observed, however, are the entrepreneurs’
choices of ﬁnancial sources. If source j is chosen, we assume that this decision
is the most proﬁtable one (Prob(πij)).
The business-speciﬁc factors x might be, for instance, patents, developed
products, a business plan, international links or collaterals. These factors may
have diﬀerent eﬀects on the costs of each alternative and may consequently
inﬂuence the relative proﬁts. A venture capitalist, for instance, will usually call
for a sound business plan. For a nascent entrepreneur without such a business
plan, it might be very costly to elaborate and write it and therefore other
sources of ﬁnance might be preferred. As explained in the Section, endowments
of a start-up are only given in the short run.
If the J disturbances of equation (2) are independent and identically dis-
tributed with type I extreme distribution, then the multinomial logit model
can be written as follows 3










for j = 0,...,3, β0 = 0. (3)
where one of the coeﬃcient vectors is normalized to zero in order to achieve
identiﬁcation. The multinomial logit model implies that the log ratio of the
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0
iβj with βk = 0. (4)
3See Greene, 2003, pp.720-723.
19This means that the estimates of βj reﬂect the marginal eﬀect of a change in
an explanatory variable xi on the log-odds ratio of j and the baseline category
k. Note, that sign and magnitude of this coeﬃcient are not necessarily identical
















In order to analyze the determinants of nascent entrepreneur’s choice between
debt, equity or no external ﬁnance at all we estimate a multinomial logit model
(MNL). Estimates of the marginal eﬀects of changes in explanatory variables
on probabilities of each ﬁnancial decision will be presented in section 6.1.
6 Results
6.1 Estimation Results
In this section we will present estimates which are obtained from separate es-
timations of the MNL model for nascent entrepreneurs in the planning stage
and nascent entrepreneurs in the early start-up stage. We did not diﬀerenti-
ate between nascent entrepreneurs who rely only on equity ﬁnance and those
who rely on both, equity and debt. Instead, we estimated the MNL model with
the three categories ‘no external ﬁnance’, ‘debt ﬁnance’ and ‘both sources of
external ﬁnance’. 4
A basic assumption of the MNL model is that irrelevant alternatives are
stochastically independent from each other (Independence from Irrelevant Al-
ternatives (IIA)-assumption), i.e. the odds ratios in the MNL model are inde-
pendent of the probabilities of other alternatives(Greene, 2003, p.724). Intu-
itively, the IIA assumption is not very plausible if nascent entrepreneurs view
two alternatives as similar rather than independent. Therefore, we tested for
4For the group of entrepreneurs in the planning stage this distinction would be since only
one entrepreneur has both, debt and equity. For the other group a Wald test of whether the
two categories ‘only equity ﬁnance’ and ‘both sources of ﬁnance’ can be combined suggest that
this is the case. Further Wald tests reject the Null hypothesis that these categories can be
further collapsed indicating that signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the determinants of external
sources of ﬁnance exist. Test results are available from the authors upon request.
20the validity of this assumption. We performed a Hausman-test and the test re-
sults suggest that the null hypothesis of IIA cannot be rejected for both groups
(planning stage, early start-up stage).5
The marginal eﬀects of the explanatory variables on the probabilities of each
category are reported for the group of nascent entrepreneurs in the planning
stage and for the group of nascent entrepreneurs in an early start-up stage in
Table3. As can be seen from this table, nascent entrepreneurs in the planning
stage who have a business plan, who have started a business before and who (or
family members) own a house have a lower probability of having no external
sources of ﬁnance. The probability of having debt ﬁnance is positively aﬀected
by the existence of a business plan and by house ownership. Obviously, the
existence of collateral is very relevant for bank loans – as expected. In contrast,
a business plan and a developed concept have a positive impact on getting
equity. Moreover, being a team start-up reduces the probability of debt ﬁnance
whereas it is positive for equity.
Results are diﬀerent for the early start-up stage. Here, the probability of
having no external sources of ﬁnance decreases if a start-up owns a patent or has
applied for patent, has developed a prototype, has launched products/services or
has established international links. Again, serial entrepreneurs and team start-
ups have a higher probability of choosing external ﬁnance. The probability
of debt ﬁnance is higher if a start-up has launched product/services and as
in the planning stage team start-ups have a lower probability of debt ﬁnance
and existence of collateral increases this probability. The probability of equity
ﬁnance is higher for start-ups that have developed a prototype and that have
contracted with companies or individuals outside the United States for goods or
services. As in the planning stage, team start-ups and start-ups with a business
plan are more likely to choose equity.
[insert table 3 about here]
[insert table 4 about here]
5This test compares the estimated coeﬃcients of a model using all three categories and a
subset where one of the categories is excluded. If the IIA assumption holds, then the estimation
of the restricted and the unrestricted model should provide similar estimates.
21The statistically insigniﬁcant eﬀect of patents for equity ﬁnance might be
explained by the fact that many start-ups with a prototype do also report
that they have applied for a patent or own a patent. Therefore, we performed
additional estimations which take this into account by diﬀerentiating between
start-ups that report only a patent, start-ups that have a prototype but no
patent and start-ups that have both. The estimation results are reported in
Table 3. For the group of entrepreneurs in the planning stage the estimations
results are hardly aﬀected. For the group of entrepreneurs in an early start-
up stage, however, results do now show that especially start-ups that report
both, patents and prototypes, have a higher probability of being externally
ﬁnanced and in particular the probability of equity ﬁnance is positively aﬀected.
However, results also show that start-ups with a prototype but no patent have
a higher probability of equity ﬁnance while this is not the case for start-ups
with patents but no prototype.
Although not reported here, we have also conducted estimations where we
controlled for industry eﬀects as well as personal characteristics of the NEs,
like education, age or gender. The basic results with respect to the relevance of
patents and prototype are, however, not aﬀected. 6
6.2 Discussion of estimation results
The empirical results suggest that innovative start-ups - with patents and pro-
totype - are more likely to be externally ﬁnanced, especially by business angels
and venture capitalists. It seems that technical knowledge per se does not have
a positive inﬂuence on the mode of ﬁnance. A signiﬁcant eﬀect only emerges if
patents are combined with the development of a prototype. One explanation for
this result is that the development of a prototype reduces information asym-
metries and resolves the problem of uncertainty associated with the outcome
of innovation eﬀorts. Hence, the expected value of an innovative new venture
may be more predictable than for non-innovative new ventures. The ﬁnding
that a prototype in combination with patent activity has a higher marginal and
6The estimation results are available from the authors upon request
22statistically more signiﬁcant eﬀect on the probability of equity ﬁnance as com-
pared to the development of a prototype without having a patent suggests that
a new venture is better situated to appropriate the beneﬁts from innovative
activity, when the underlying intellectual property is, in fact, legally protected
by patents. On the one hand, innovation cannot be easily imitated by competi-
tors. On the other hand, opportunistic behavior of the investor is also less likely
which may make the NE more willing to accept equity, i.e. a close relationship
and share of ownership with the investor.
Our results extend the ﬁndings of empirical studies by looking at the stage-
wise preference for ﬁnance. Studies like Audretsch and Lehmann (2004) 7 posit
that small, young and innovative ﬁrms ﬁnd it diﬃcult to obtain external ﬁnance
and their general preference would be towards new equity since debt is unavail-
able and in some cases not enough to ﬁnance subsequent innovative activity.
We argue that even though this may be true, the preference or for that mat-
ter the combinations that the entrepreneurs confront may change depending
on the new venture stage. Acs (2002) ﬁnds that small innovative ﬁrms have a
greater propensity for debt, which we view depends on the stage of the ﬁrm.
These ﬁrms may rely on more risky sources of ﬁnance until suﬃcient retained
earnings are established, since internal ﬁnance is found to be crucial for further
R&D (Himmelberg & Petersen, 1994), and then the next option would be debt,
since the collateral requirements in terms of ﬁxed assets, cash position, may be
met.
This supports a proposition that the pecking order ﬁnancing (Myers & Ma-
jluf, 1984) may change not in its usual order of retained earnings, debt,inside
equity and outside equity, right from the stage 1 of ﬁrm growth, but rather this
ordering may change in very early stages. We suspect that the ordering hierar-
chies keep changing until the ﬁrm suﬃciently matures enabling it to build its
retained earnings and ﬁxed assets and then the usual pecking order could be
followed. What follows therefore is that in the very early stages, the start-ups
may have to accept the risk in return for a lower likelihood of survival. The
7some more examples are: Stewart Thornhill (2004),Carpenter and Petersen (2002),Mueller
and Zimmermann (2006),Baldwin and Gellatly (2004)
23other interesting ﬁnding is that the probability of obtaining external ﬁnance
and the tendency toward equity increases with the knowledge endowments of
the new venture, which suggests that the mode of ﬁnance depends on the growth
of knowledge endowments and this growth, in turn, may be an investee induced
growth or investor encouraged growth , which we term as learning eﬀects on
ﬁnancing strategy.
7 Conclusion
Perhaps in response to a growing concern that ﬁnancing constraints (adversely)
impact innovative activity and ultimately growth, a large and compelling lit-
erature has recently emerged analyzing the links between the mode of ﬁnance
and ﬁrm characteristics. However, these studies have been restricted to ana-
lyzing how existing, incumbent ﬁrms are subjected to ﬁnancing constraints.
Yet, it may be that ﬁnancing constraints have the greatest impact on poten-
tial entrepreneurs’ deterrence from even starting their ﬁrm. In this paper we
therefore shift the lens away from established, incumbent ﬁrms, to nascent en-
trepreneurs. In particular, the relationship between the innovation activities of
nascent entrepreneurs and their ﬁnancial decisions is analyzed. The paper ar-
gues that innovative nascent entrepreneurs are especially vulnerable to problems
in procuring external ﬁnance because of uncertainty, appropriability problems
and information asymmetries.
We developed two hypotheses in this paper: First, nascent entrepreneurs
who can protect their proprietary intellectual property through patents have a
higher probability of getting obtaining ﬁnance, and second, nascent entrepreneurs
who can signal reduced uncertainty with respect to innovation outcome have a
higher probability of obtaining external ﬁnance. The estimation results provide
evidence in support of both hypotheses. In particular, our results indicate that
innovative nascent entrepreneurs have a higher probability of obtaining equity
than do non-innovative entrepreneurs. In contrast, the likelihood of debt ﬁnance
is not aﬀected by innovative activity. However, the positive eﬀect on equity does
only occur if nascent entrepreneurs have successfully developed a prototype and
24also have patented an invention or have applied for a patent. One interpretation
of this result is that the development of a prototype reduces information asym-
metries and resolves the problem of uncertainty associated with the outcome
of innovation eﬀorts. While prototypes may signal less risk, patents may signal
that the nascent entrepreneur is well positioned to appropriate the returns from
her investment in intangible assets.
Moreover, the share of new ventures which are innovative increases remark-
ably between the planning stage of a start-up and the incipient or early start-up
stage. Other business related characteristics, such as international orientation,
participating in a team venture, or the existence of a business plan also inﬂuence
the likelihood of obtaining external ﬁnance. While a large literature has emerged
analyzing the ﬁnancial decisions of ﬁrms, virtually no study has yet been un-
dertaking examining the ﬁnancial decisions of innovative nascent entrepreneurs.
Previous studies in the ﬁelds of economics and ﬁnance focused primarily on ﬁrm
characteristics, industry characteristics or macroeconomic eﬀects. Few studies
have considered the decision making by potential entrepreneurs that can ulti-
mately lead to the start-up of a new venture and what the role of ﬁnance plays
in shaping the process by which such new ventures are launched. Hence, this
paper contributes to the existing literature.
Future theoretical research could formalize the learning process of innova-
tive nascent entrepreneurs and investors through the signals that are exchanged.
Another fruitful research opportunity involves the construction and application
of panel data sets to analyze the ﬁnancial decisions of innovative nascent en-
trepreneurs. This would, for example, enable new insights into the impact of
ﬁnancial decisions on the performance of new ventures as they evolve over the
life cycle. One thing is clear from this paper, however. The ease to which exter-
nal ﬁnance can be obtain impacts considerably more than existing, incumbent
ﬁrms. Rather, it also impacts the decision and ability of potential or nascent
entrepreneurs in launching new ventures as well.
25A Questions
Deﬁning and identifying nascent entrepreneurs
• Which category best describes you? (Answer: Entrepreneur seeking cap-
ital to start a new business, Entrepreneur seeking capital for an oper-
ating business; Entrepreneur interested in business planning services or
seminars; Visitor searching for general information about raising capi-
tal; Investor interested in investment opportunities; vFinance Investments
Client; vFinance Employee or Associate.)
• Are you actively involved in running this business? (Answer: YES/NO)
• What percent of this business do you own? (Answer: 0, 1 - 25, 26 - 50, 51
- 75, 76 - 99, 100)
• Did your business generate revenue in the ﬁrst quarter of 2005 (January
2005 through March 2005)? (Answer:YES/NO)
• 2004 revenue. In U.S. dollars? (Answer: Over 10 million, 5 million to
10 million, 1 million to 5 million, 500,000 to 999,999, 250,000 to 499,999,
150,000 to 249,999, 100,000 to 149,999, 75,000 to 99,999, 50,000 to 74,999,
25,000 to 49,999, 1 to 24,999, No revenue in 2004.)
Distinguishing between planning stage and early start-up stage
• Which of these best describes you? (Answer: I currently own and operate
a business; I am planning to start a new business; I am interested in
private investments in businesses; None of the above.),
• Where is your business in the start-up process?”. (Answer: concept in
development, concept developed, prototype developed, start-up operation
or product/service launched.)
External sources of ﬁnance
26• What sources of business ﬁnancing have you already used to establish
this business? (Answer: bank loans to the business, home equity loan in
an owner’s name, other bank loans in an owner’s name, venture funds in
exchange for stock/ownership in company, individual investors or compa-
nies in exchange for stock/ownership in company.)
Business characteristics
• Does your business own or have you applied for a patent that is essential
to the business? (Answer: YES/NO)
• Has your business contracted with any companies or individuals outside
the United States for goods or services? (Answer: YES/NO)
• Do you have a written business plan for your business? (Answer: YES/NO)
• Have you started another business before this business? (Answer: YES/NO)
• Do you or anyone in your household own your residence? (Answer: YES/NO)
• Which of the following best describes how your business was started? (An-
swer: A new business created by a single person; A new business created
by a team of people; A business inherited from someone else; Purchase of
an existing business; Purchase of a franchise)
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29Table 1: Descriptive statistics
planning stage early start-up stage
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Z-test
Debt 0.120 0.325 0.192 0.394 3.0*
Equity 0.061 0.240 0.204 0.404 6.3*
Patents 0.155 0.362 0.323 0.468 5.9*
Concept in development 0.296 0.457 N.A. N.A. N.A.
Concept developed 0.636 0.482 0.304 0.461 -10.0*
Prototype developed 0.068 0.252 0.260 0.439 7.7*
Start-up operation N.A. N.A. 0.390 0.488 N.A.
Product/service N.A. N.A. 0.046 0.209 N.A.
Business plan 0.601 0.490 0.835 0.371 7.9*
Serial entrepreneur 0.467 0.500 0.600 0.490 4.0*
International links 0.110 0.314 0.215 0.411 4.2*
Team 0.340 0.474 0.479 0.500 4.2*
House 0.587 0.493 0.625 0.485 1.2
Notes: All variables are dummy variables that take on the values one or zero. N.A. means
not applicable. Z-test for the equality between two proportions: * denotes signiﬁcant at the 1
percent level.
30Table 2: Descriptive statistics: patents and sources of ﬁnance
planning stage
no external debt equity both Total
no patents 299 40 20 1 360
(85.4) (80.0) (80.0) (100.0) (84.5)
patents 51 10 5 0 66
(14.6) (20.0) (20.0) (0.0) (15.5)
350 50 25 1 426
(100) (100) (100) (100) (100)
early start-up stage
no patents 229 49 34 13 325
(74.1) (67.1) (43.0) (68.4) (67.7)
patents 80 24 45 6 155
(25.9) (32.3) (56.7) (31.6) (32.3)
309 73 79 19 480
(100) (100) (100) (100) (100)
Notes: Percentage in parentheses.
31Table 3: Determinants of nascent entrepreneurs’ external sources of ﬁnance
planning stage early start-up stage
Variable No Debt Both No Debt Both
Patents -0.019 0.028 -0.009 -0.105** 0.041 0.064
(0.048) (0.045) (0.017) (0.052) (0.041) (0.039)
Prototype devel. -0.139 -0.021 0.160 -0.122* -0.0335 0.155***
(0.13) (0.048) (0.14) (0.065) (0.044) (0.058)
Concept devel. 0.0192 -0.0547 0.036* N.A. N.A. N.A.
(0.039) (0.034) (0.020)
Start-up oper. N.A. N.A. N.A. -0.037 0.036 0.001
(0.055) (0.042) (0.043)
Product/service N.A. N.A. N.A. -0.211* 0.211* -0.001
(0.12) (0.12) (0.093)
Business plan -0.095*** 0.0558** 0.0394** -0.0178 -0.056 0.074*
(0.031) (0.027) (0.018) (0.059) (0.049) (0.040)
Serial entrep. -0.053* 0.0323 0.0202 -0.106** 0.060* 0.046
(0.031) (0.028) (0.016) (0.044) (0.033) (0.035)
Internat.links -0.079 0.0346 0.0445 -0.116** 0.0094 0.107**
(0.059) (0.050) (0.036) (0.058) (0.043) (0.047)
Team 0.024 -0.0615** 0.0373* -0.135*** -0.0616* 0.197***
(0.033) (0.026) (0.021) (0.046) (0.034) (0.037)
House -0.094*** 0.115*** -0.0215 -0.132*** 0.114*** 0.0178
(0.032) (0.028) (0.016) (0.043) (0.032) (0.035)
χ2-statistic 60.48 109.9
Pseudo R2 0.122 0.128
Actual Frequ. 350 50 26 309 73 98
Pred. Frequ. 373 39 14 334 71 75
Notes: Multinomial Logit Estimation results. The standard errors are reported in parentheses.
The asterisks *, ** and *** denote signiﬁcant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively.
The estimates reﬂect the marginal eﬀects of a change of the respective dummy variables from
0 to 1.
32Table 4: Determinants of nascent entrepreneurs’ external sources of ﬁnance
planning stage early start-up stage
Variable No Debt Both No Debt Both
Patents/protot. -0.140 -0.005 0.145 -0.272*** 0.009 0.263***
(0.13) (0.057) (0.13) (0.080) (0.057) (0.081)
Only prototype -0.121 0.0162 0.105 -0.0929 -0.067 0.160*
(0.17) (0.11) (0.15) (0.089) (0.047) (0.087)
Only patents -0.020 0.035 -0.015 -0.077 0.016 0.061
(0.052) (0.050) (0.017) (0.065) (0.048) (0.054)
Concept devel. 0.019 -0.055 0.036* N.A. N.A. N.A.
(0.039) (0.034) (0.020)
Start-up oper. N.A. N.A. N.A. -0.036 0.035 0.001
(0.054) (0.042) (0.043)
Product/service N.A. N.A. N.A. -0.215* 0.216* -0.001
(0.12) (0.12) (0.094)
Business plan -0.094*** 0.055** 0.039** -0.021 -0.053 0.074*
(0.031) (0.027) (0.018) (0.059) (0.049) (0.040)
Serial entrep. -0.052* 0.032 0.020 -0.107** 0.061* 0.047
(0.031) (0.028) (0.016) (0.044) (0.033) (0.035)
Internat.links -0.080 0.035 0.045 -0.116** 0.010 0.107**
(0.059) (0.050) (0.036) (0.058) (0.043) (0.047)
Team 0.025 -0.063** 0.038* -0.137*** -0.060* 0.197***
(0.033) (0.026) (0.021) (0.046) (0.034) (0.038)
House -0.094*** 0.115*** -0.021 -0.135*** 0.117*** 0.019
(0.032) (0.028) (0.016) (0.044) (0.032) (0.035)
χ2-statistic 60.58 111.1
Pseudo R2 0.122 0.129
Actual Frequ. 350 50 26 309 73 98
Pred. Frequ. 373 39 14 334 71 75
Notes: Multinomial Logit Estimation results. The standard errors are reported in parentheses.
The asterisks *, ** and *** denote signiﬁcant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively.
The estimates reﬂect the marginal eﬀects of a change of the respective dummy variables from
0 to 1.
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